As with its 1929 predecessor, the list of popular explanations for-the panic of 1987 runs the gamut fr-om the purely economic and financial to the frailties inherent in human nature see opposite pagel. Recently, a number-of more-or-less official investigating agencies have released reports about the October panic.' Generally speaking, these reports do not attempt to identify the reason for the decline in stock prices. Rather, the)' focus on the factors that characterized it as a panic: the sharpness of the decline on October 19 and the tumultuous trading activity that occurred on this day and during the following week.
Virtually all of the reports agr-ee that the inability of the New York and other cash market exchanges to process the unpr-ecedented volume of trades quickly contributed impor-tantly to the market turmoil. They disagree widely, however-, about the reasons for-the sharpness of the decline.
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THE' cASGAIJE THEORY
The Brady Commission suggests that the stock market panic is best explained by the 'cascade theory." This theory argues that "mechanical, price-insensitive selling" by institutions using portfolio insurance strategies conti'ibuted significantly to the break in stock pr-ices! In an effort to liquidate the equity exposure of their poi-tfolios quickly, these institutions sold stock index futures contracts in the Chicago market. Such sales lowered the price of the futures contmacts relative to the price of the equivalent basket of stocks in the New York cash mar-ket. The decline in the futur'es price relative to the cash price induced index ar-hitrageurs to purchase futures contiacts in the Cliicago mamtet (which, in their view, were undervalued( and sell (short( the underlying stocks in the New York market (which, in their view, were overvalued m'elative to futuresL Thus, index arbitrage tr-ansmitted the selling pressur'e from the Chicago fijtui-es mam-ket to the New Yom-k cash market causing cash p1-ices in New York to decline, 'I'he stor does not end here. According to the theory, the decline in cash prices triggered a fur--ther selling wave in the Chicago market by portfolio insur-ers that index arbitr'ageurs, again, transmitted to the New York mar'ket. 'i'his process was r'epeated time after time causing a "downward cascade' in stock prices." 'i'he Brady Commission suggests that support for' the cascade theory can be found by examining the behavior of the spread (the hasist hetween the price of stock index futur-es contracts and the cash prices of the shares undem-lying the contracts." The basis is nos-mally positive. Stock index fi.rtui-es pr-ices generally exceed cash pm'ices because the net costs of car-rying stock forwar-d Iintei-est cost less expected diviclends( am-c typically positive." During the panic, however, the basis turned negative. The Comnussion suggests that this obsen'ation is consistent with the cascade theory.
Chart 1 plots both the price of the December Standard and Poor's 500 futures contract and the Standard and Poor's index of 500 common stocks. The latter-r'epr-esents the cash price of the stocks underlying the futures contract. The data cover halt-hour intervals during October 15-23, 1987, Chait 2 plots the basis -the difference between the two prices shown in chart lAs one can see, the basis fell below zero in the late afternoon of October 16 and, with a few exceptions, remained negative for the rest of the week. Fur1hermore, since the expected price of the stock one year from now falls to $13.27, the basis falls to $391 = $1327-812.881. Other things the same, a decline in the expected growth i-ate of dividends causes a decline in the curr-ent price, the futures price and the basis. For reasons discussed later, futures prices typically respond to new information more rapidly than indexes of cash mas-ket pr'ices. This was particularly so during the crash. In terms of our example, if the futures pr-ice declines immediately to $13.27 but cash prices adjust less quickly, the observed basis may be negative during the adjustment period. In shor-t, there is no need for a special theory, like the cascade theory, to explain the behavior of the basis during the week of October 19,'.
trrationai Price-Insensitive Traders
Stock prices declined throughout the day of October 19, 1987. The decline was particularly sharp in the afternoon (see chart flAt about 1:30 p.m. EST, the price of a December S&.P 500 futures contract was about 15 points lower than the cash pi-ices of the stocks under-lying the contract (that is, the basis was -15 points, see chart 2). This means that liquidating the basket of stocks underlying the S&P 500 through futures mar-ket sales was about $7,500 niore costly (before transaction costsl than liquidating the same basket in the cash market." Yet, according to the cascade theory, portfolio insurers continued to liquidate in the futures mar'ket. In the words of the Brady Commission, this appar-ently anomalous behavior was the result of "mechanical price-insensitive selling." Put moie bluntly, the theory attributes the obser--vation to irrationality on the part of porttblio managers who, by most accounts -including those of the Brady Commission -are credited with being highly sophisticated financial experts.
The Missing il.rhs
The cascade theory depends on index arbitr-age activity to transnut selling pressur-e from the firtures to the cash market. Yet, by all accounts, indcx arbitrage virtually ceased about 1:30 p.m. EST on october' 19.6 Cash market prices, however, fell sharply between 1:30 and the market's close. The S&P 500 index lost about 30 points during this time, while the Dow fell by more than 300 points. Furtherniore, index ai-bitrage was severely restricted in subsequent trading days because the NYSE limited use of its DOT system by arbitrageur-s. However, this did not pr'event a further sharp decline in stock prices on October 26.
Foreign Markets and Previous Panics
The cascade theory fails to explain why stock market panics in for-eign markets occurred at the same time as the US. panic. Programmed trading is virtually nonexistent in overseas markets. Yet these markets crashed as qirickly and by as much as the U.S. market. Between October 16 and 23, for example, the UK. stock market declined 22 percent, the German and Japanese markets fell 12 percent, the French market fell 10 percent and the U.S. market declined 13 percent. What's more, programmed trading dates back no further-than 1982 when stock index futures contracts began trading. U.S. stock market panics have a much longer history. Since the cascade theory does not explain these other panics, there is some reason to be skeptical about its usefulness in explaining the latest U.S. panic.
AN ALTE'R.NATIVE EXPLANATION: EFFICIE.NT MARKETS
A long-standing proposition in both economics and finance is that stock prices ai'e formed in efficient mar'kets." This means that all of the rele-'ant information currently known about interest r'ates, dividends and the future prospects for firms (the fundamentals) is contained in current stock prices. Stock prices change only when new information regarding the fundamentals is obtained by someone. New information, by definition, cannot be predicted ahead of its arrival; because the news is just as likely to be good as it is to be bad, jumps in stock pr-ices cannot be pi-edicted in advance.
If the efficient markets hypothesis is correct, past piice changes contain no useful information "See, in addition, Malkiel (1988) Brealey and Meyers (1984), pp. 266-81; Malkiel (1981), pp. 171-79; Brealey (1983) , pp. 15-IS; Leroy (1982) and Fama (1970) .
about future price changes. With some added assumptions, this can be translated into a useful empirical proposition. If transaction costs are low, the expected return to holding stock is constant and the volatility of stock prices does not change during the time period examined, the efficient market hypothesis implies that observed changes in stock prices will be uncorr'elated. The sequence of prce changes are unrelated; they behave as random variables. This is sometimes called "weak form efficiency."
This implication contiasts sharply with a central implication of the cascade theory. The cascade theoiy suggests that price changes in both the cash and futures markets are positively corielated with their own past. This follows from the theory's circularity which attributes sharp price declines to immediately preceding sharp declines.
The behavior of U.S. stock prices generally conforms to the efficient markets hypothesis in the sense that past changes in stock prices contain no useful information about future changes." However, when data on stock price indexes are observed at very high frequency lintra-day but not day-to-day), changes in the level of cash niarket indexes ar-c correlated and appear to lag changes in futures prices." This behavior appears to favor the cascade theory. When difi'erences in the 'mar-ket-making" techniques employed in the cash and futures markets are taken into account, however, intra-day data from both markets reject the cascade theoiy, while, on the whole, they are consistent with the efficient markets hypothesis."
Market-Making in the Gash Market
Trading on the NYSE is conducted by members who trade within an auction framework at posts manned by specialists." Specialists' activities ar-c concentrated on a par'ticular group of stocks that are traded at a particular post. One of the main functions of a specialist is to execute limit orders foi other members of the Exchange. A limit order is an order to buy (sell) a specified number of shares of a given stock when and if the price of the stock falls (rises) to some specified level. The specialist maintains a book in which these orders ar-c recorded and to which only lie has access. The ability to place a limit order' with a specialist frees the hr-oker who places the order' tr-om having to wait at the post for a pr-ice movement that may never-occur.
For example, suppose the infor-mation contained in the specialist's book for shar-es of XYZ cot-poration is summarized in figure 1 ." The demand curve aggregates the purchase ordei's that have been placed with the specialist. These include bids of $9'/s for' 400 shares, $9¾for 300 shares, etc. The supply curve aggregates the specialist's sell orders of 100 shares at $l0'/s, 200 shares at $10'/4, etc. Broker's, standing at the post, trade XYZ shares with each other' and the specialist. At any time, a brokei-may i-equest a quote fr'om the specialist who, given the information in figure 1, would respond "$B'/s for 400, 100 at $10'/s," This indicates that the specialist has buy or'der-s for 400 shares at $97/s and sell orders for 100 shares at S10'/s. If the buy and sell orders of the other brokers at the post are in balance at the current price, trading in XYZ shares will occur within the price range of $9'/s bid and £10 i/~ask." Suppose, however, that a broker has a market buy order for 300 shares that he is unable to cross with a broker with sell orders for 300 shares at the quoted spr-ead (in this case, at an ask pr-ice of $10'/s or less). Since the specialist's quote indicates that he will sell 100 shares at 510½,the broker will respond "Take it." The broker has purchased 100 shares from the specialist at $10'/s. Since the broker must buy another 200 shares, he will ask for a further-quote. If nothing further has occur-red, the specialist will quote "$97s for 400, 200 at 810¼."The broker will respond "Take it." The broker has satisfied the market buy order for 300 shares of XYZ. He purchased 100 shares at $10'/s and 200 shares at $10'/4. Of course, the broker could have acquired 300 shares immediately by offering to pay a price of $ 10 i/ 4
hut the cost would have been gr-eater. Instead, it pays the broker to try to "walk up" the supply curve by executing a number of trades rather than jumping directly to the pt-ice that will get him 300 shares in " Malkiel (1981) , Brealey (1983) and Fama (1970) . "See Perry (1985) ; Atchison, Butler and Simonds (1987) and Harris (1988) .
"See Grossman and Miller (1988) for a discussion of why trading rules many differ across the markets.
"Of course, the NYSE is not the only cash market for stocks, but it is a major market. Because of its relative size, the discussion focuses on this market. "For purposes of exposition, the figure and discussion ignore the effect of "stops" and "stop loss orders" on the book. "See Stoll (1985) , Shultz (1946) 
, pp. 119-44 and The New York
Stock Exchange Market (1979) , pp. 14-21 and pp. 30-31 -
Figure 1 An Illustration of Limit Order Supply and Demand
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one trade." Similar reasoning applies to situations in which excess market sell orders exist at the quoted spread.
Notice that this process of "walking up" the supply curve or' "walking down" the demand curve can generate a sequence of recorded transaction pr ces that run in the same direction. The larger the excess of market buy (or sell) orders is relative to the size of the specialist's limit order-s at various prices, the longer the sequence of recorded transaction prices that run in the same direction and the greater the likelihood that recorded price changes over the time interval ar'e correlated. This situation is particularly likely to arise during panics when large order imbalances develop at quoted pr-ices.
Specialist Rule 104
Specialists are required by rule SR 104 to maintain a "fair and otderly" market. More specifically, the rule states that Itilie maintenance of a fair and orderly market implies the maintenance of price continuity with r-ea- "Under NYSE rules, public orders have precedence over specialists' orders at the same price. See Stoll (1985) , p. 7.
sonablr depth, and the minimizing of the effects of temporary disparity between supply and demand.
In connection with the maintenance of a fair and or'der'ly market, it is commonly desir'ahle that a specialist engage to a reasonahle degree under existing circumstances in dealings for his own account when lack of price continuity, lack of depth. or clisparity between supply and demand exists or' is reasonably to be anticipated."
For example, rule SR 104 requires the specialist to buy shares for his own account to assist the maintenance of an orderly mar-ket if~in his estimation, sell orders temporarily exceed buy orders at the existing market price and conversely. If these imbalances are truly temporary, the trades requir-ed by SR 104 will be profitable for-the specialist; evidence indicates that specialists typically sell on up ticks in pr-ice and buy on down ticks." If large order imbalances develop that threaten the orderliness of the market, the specialist may institute an opening delay or trading halt. The specialist needs the approval of a floor official or-governor to do this and to establish a new opening price."
The effect of SR 104 is to smooth what would otherwise be abrupt movements in stock prices, at least over shor4 periods of time a few minutes). Rather than allowing the price to move directly to sor~renew level, specialist trading temporarily retards the movement. This can generate a sequence of cor-related pt-ice changes.
Ma rk.et~Ma king in the Futures Market
Trading in futures mar-kets is governed by CFTC r-ules that require all trades of futures contracts to be executed openly arid competitively by "open outcry." In particular, the trading arena, or pit, has no single auctioneer through whom all trades ar-c funneled. Rather, the pit is composed of many trader-s who call out their bids and offers to each other. The traders are not required to stabilize the mar-ket. They may at any time take any side of a transaction even though this might add to an imbalance of buy and sell orders at the quoted price, and they may leave the pit (r-efuse to trade) at any time. At the time of the crash, there was no rule regarding limit moves in the price of the Standar-d and Poor's futures contract.
'I'hese rules contain no r-equirement to smooth out movements in the price. Tr'aders ar-c free to move the price immediately to a new level. Unlike the cash market, there are no trading rules in futures markets that are likely to result in correlated price changes. Furthermore, since there were no rules that retarded price changes in the futures market, futures prices were fl-ce to adjust more quickly than cash prices so changes in futur-es prices may lead changes in cash prices.
.Diflèrent instruments
It is important to note that different instruments are traded in the cash and futures markets. Stock index futures contracts are agreements between a seller )short position) and a buyer (long position) to a cash settlement based on the change in a stock index's value between the date the contract is enter-ed by the two par-ties and some future date." The instrument underlying the futures contract is a large basket of different stocks, that is, the stocks contained in the Major-Market Index, the Value Line index, the S&.P 500 Index, etc. No such instrument is traded in the cash market, where purchasing or-selling 500 different stocks, for example, requires as many different transactions arid can only be executed at significantly higher-costs."
The different instruments traded in the cash and futures mar-kets have a further implication for rhe relationship between observed price changes between the two n arkets. The cash market prices shown in chart 1, as well as those examined by the Brady Commission, are measured by an index. The index is an average of the prices of all the stocks included in the index. When the index is observed at a very high frequency (say, minute-byminute), some of the stocks included in the index may riot have traded during the interval between observations, if not, the level of cash prices measured by the index includes some prices from previous observations. in other words, the index 
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includes some "stale" prices. The term used to describe this phenomenon is "nonsynchronous trading."
Typically, nonsynchr'onous tr'ading does not cr-eate a serious measur-ement problem. Undernormal conditions, a buy or-sell order is executed in about two minutes on the NYSE. On October 16 and during the week of October 19, however, the time required to execirte orders rose markedly:" On those days, the index contained a considerable number of stale prices." The subsequent piecemeal adjustment of these stale prices for indiiidual stocks could explain correlated changes in the level of the cash market index. This is shown in the table 2 example. The example assumes that the index is a simple average of the prices of three stocks (A, B and C) divided by the average price in period zem and multiplied by 100. The initial prices (in period zero) are equilibrium pr-ices (i.e., they contain all currently available relevant information). Then, new information becomes available in period I that eventually will cause a 10 percent decline in all stock prices. if there is nonsynchronous trading, the revisions will occur-piecemeal for each of the stocks. One example of this is shown in the table: the price of stock A falls in period 1, the price of stock B falls in period 2, etc. If the index is repor-ted in each per-iod, it will display positively corr'eiated changes as shown in the table.
The stale price pr-ohlem is not relevant for futures mar'ket prices; futures prices are actual prices. As a result, changes in futures prices will appear to lead changes in the cash mar-ket index if the index contains a substantial number of stale prices.
THE DIFFEHE'NT IMPLICATIONS
The centr-al feature of the cascade theory is that declines in cash and futures prices reinforced each other and led to further declines in both markets. The theory suggests that declines in the pr-ice of stock index futures contr-acts caused a decline in the cash prices of the underlying stocks, and this dr'op caused a further decline in the pr-ices of index futures contracts. If the theory is correct, changes in cash prices will be positively correlated with past changes in the price of index futures and conversely. The cascade theory further-implies that price changes in cacti market are positively correlated with their own past changes. This follows from the circularity of the theory which attr-ibutes sharp declines in stock prices to immediately preceding sharp declines. Finally, since the cascade theory contends that this specific behavior caused the panic, these correlations should be observed during the panic, but not at other times.
The efficient markets hypothesis suggests that market-making in the cash market and nonsynchronous trading could produce intra-day cash market price changes that are correlated. Furthermore, the hypothesis suggests that changes in futures prices may lead changes in cash prices. These implications are similar to the implications of the cascade theory. The two differ', however, in three important respects. Unlike the cascade theory, the efficient markets hypothesis suggests that:
(11 Changes in the price of stock index futures contracts are uncorrelated, (2) Changes in cash prices do not lead changes in futures prices, and i3) Relationships that exist across the two markets are not unique to the panic. 
TESTING THE TWO THE' ORIES
These theories are tested using minute-byminute data on the level of the Standard and Poor's 500 index (S&P 500) and the price of the December 1987 Standard and Poor's 500 index futures contract (S&P 500 Futur-es). The level of the S&,P 500 index represents the cash price of the stocks underlying the S&P 500 futures contr-act. All tests are conducted using first differ'ences of the natural logs of the levels. This tr-ansformation of the data approximates one-minute per-centage changes (expressed in decimals) in cash and futures market prices. The data cover' the trading days immediately before, during and after the panic: October 16, 19 and 20."
A few comments about the data are important. The NYSE, on which the great bulk of the stocks included in the S&P 500 index are traded, was open from 9:30 am. to 4:00 p.m. ES~'T' on the above days. The CME, which trades the S&P 500 futures Were changes in Stock Prices Correlated? Table 3 presents the results of a test (called a Box-Pier-ce test) based on the estimated autocorrelations of percentage changes in cash market prices. This test is designed to determine whether the data ar-c significantly correlated, that is, whether current changes in cash market prices ar-c related to their-own past changes. Both theories discussed in this paper suggest that intra-day, high-frequency cash market price changes will be positively correlated, although the reasons for the positive correlation are considerably different. As a result, these data do not help discriminate between the two theories. if the data pr'ove inconsistent with this implication, however, neither-theory performs well in explaining the behavior of cash market prices.
The data in table 3 indicate that minute-tominute changes in the S&P 500 Index ar-c significantly correlated. Furthermore, the correlations ar-c positive at least over the initial lag." 
A, ',~/''P"~'/77',/7'A~. 'N' opened for trading on the NYSE and the rumors at that time that the SEC would call a trading halt. See Miller, Hawke, Malkiel and Scholes (1987) , wire report summary.
tables 1
mated coefficients am'e sensitive to the lag length and to identily statistically redundant lags, the lag stm-uctur-e was successively shor'tened by one lag. At each stage, the t-statistic for the coefficient of the most distant lag was examined. If the test indicated the coefficient was statistically insignificant, that lag was dropped and the equation was r'eestimated with one less lag. 'l'his process was r'epeated until the test r-ejected the hypothesis that the estimated coefficient of the most distant remaining lag was zero!"
The estimates shown in table 5 indicate that the lags ranged from about two minutes on October' 16 to five minutes on October 20." It r-equir-es about two minutes to execute a trade on the NYSE under normal trading conditions. During the panic, execution times ranged from about 10 to 75 minutes at tirues." in view of this, the lags estimated in table 5 do not appear' to be long enough to r-eject the efficient muar-kets hypothesis; also, since they varied over the period, it is doubtfnl that past pr-ice changes contained information that could be exploited by traders.
Did Stock Price Changes Reinforce Each Other Across Markets?
The central feature of the cascade theory can be tested by deternunirig whether-past pr-ice changes in the futur-es market help explain cur-rent price changes in the cash market and conversely. This is done by regr-essing the change in cash prices on past changes in cash prices; then, past changes in futures pr-ices ar-c added to the estimated r-egression equation to see if they imnpr-ove the equation's explanatory power. An F-test is conducted to determine whether-the addition of the futures market data significantly increases the cash price equation's coefficient of determination (H'). The "See Anderson (1971), pp. 223 and 275-76 . It is possible that this test may reject some lags that are, in fact, significant if taken as a group. To control for this, F-tests were run with the lag length in the unrestricted model set at 15. The number of lags in the restricted model was set at 12 to determine if the three omitted lags were significant. The lags in the restricted model was then reduced to nine and the test repeated, etc.
problem that the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis (the estimated coefficient is zero) when it is true rises as the lag length is reduced. Consequently, the true lag lengths may be shorter than those estimated in tableS. See Batten and Thornton (1983), pp. 22-23, and Anderson (1971) , pp. 30-43. The r-esults of this test are presented in table 6 for each of the trading days examined in this paper-. The lag length employed on each day is the one identified by the table 5 test." The results for cash market prices show that the addition of past changes in futures prices improve the regression estimates; this suggests that price changes in the futures mar-ket preceded those in the cash market. 'I'his r-esult is consistent with both the cascade theory and the efficient mar'kets hypothesis. Fur'-them-more, it is not unique to the panic; it has been observed for intm-a-day price data during other periods as well.
4 '
Other table 6 results, however-, are inconsistent with the cascade theory. The inclusion of past changes in cash prices in the regressions that estimate the change in futures pr-ices does not significantly impr-ove the estimates, This rejects the notion that past changes in cash prices help explain changes in ftrtures prices. 'I'his finding is inconsistent with the centr-al featur-e of the cascade theory, which suggests the panic was caused by declines in cash and futures prices that became lar-ger as they tumbled over' each other on the way down,
CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the cascade theory, which has been advanced as an explanation of the October 1987 stock market panic. The theory relies on the notion that stock traders behave "mechanically," are "insensitive to price," and execute " Hsiao (1981) uses a similar method. These lag lengths apply to the cash market, Analysis of the futures market suggests that the appropriate lag for this market is zero. "See Kawaller, Koch and Koch (1987) .
tr-ansactions in markets without regard to transaction costs, 'these assertions are inconsistent with the behavior of wealth-maximizing individuals. Not only ar-c the theoretical underpinnings of the cascade theory weak, the data do not support the theory. tnstead, the observed relationships that do exist between the markets are not unique to the cr-ash and can be explained by a theory that relies on wealth maximizing behavior-.
Almost 60 years later', the cause of the 'Great Cr-ash" in October 1929 is still being debated. Those with even longer memories know that them-c is little agm'eement about what caused the stock market panic in 1907. Although financial reforms followed each of these panics, history indicates that the refomms have done little to r-educe the frequency or-severity of panics. Without a reliable theoretical guide to the mechanics of a panic, any r-eform is no more than a "shot in the dark." The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the reform,s advanced by proponents of the cascade theory are unlikely to alter-this historical pattern.
